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PUNITIVE DAMAGES, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS,
AND THE ECONOMY OF CIVIL LITIGATION
Stephen C. Yeazell*
INTRODUCTION
One of David Shapiro's more remarkable virtues as a scholar is
his versatility. He moves easily from dialogues concerning federal ju-
risdiction to theories of statutory interpretation to pioneering pieces
of empirical scholarship designed to find out just how discovery really
works in the world of practice, and how big a burden prisoner peti-
tions really were for federal judges.1 This third vein in David's schol-
arship is my inspiration for this foray into the Supreme Court's
struggles with the apparatus it has created for judging punitive dam-
ages. David Shapiro's empirical work reflects a determination to un-
cover the facts lying behind deeply embedded demonologies of
litigation. 2 That task is worth performing on a regular basis-the
world has enough real demons without our inventing extra ones. The
Supreme Court has struck a blow at one of civil litigation's favorite
demons-excessive punitive damages. My task is to explain what
might really be happening with punitive damages and to assess how
the Court's actions might affect the conduct of civil litigation in unex-
pected ways.
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am
particularly pleased at having this opportunity to thank David for his years of
encouragement, despite which I have never taught Federal Courts-to his distress but
doubtless to the benefit of generations of law students. In making this exploration, I
have learned much from Theodore Eisenberg, from Allen M. Katz, and from Joseph
Doherty (of UCLA School of Law's Empirical Research Group), none of whom shares
responsibility for what I have misunderstood.
I See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87
HARv. L. REv. 321 (1973); David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary
System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055 (1979).
2 The demonologies in question were the assertedly widespread abuse of discov-
ery and the burden on federal courts in disposing of massive numbers of unfounded
prisoner petitions.
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I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE SUPREME COURT
Before last Term's case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell,3 the Court had been wrestling with this issue for fifteen
years. During that period the Court decided seven punitive damages
cases, most exhibiting irritated uncertainty about how to deal with
what the majority perceived as a problem of constitutional dimen-
sions. Unfortunately, the Court's perception that there was a problem
has often proved more robust than its sense of what the problem was
or how to solve it. I want to suggest, respectfully and tentatively, that
part of the difficulty of the problem may have flowed from the place
of punitives in the folklore-the demonology, if you will-of civil
litigation.
A. Struggling for an Approach
The Court's first step, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,4 involved a commercial dispute in which the de-
fendant's managers were told to put the competitor-plaintiff out of
business-"Do whatever it takes. Squish him like a bug"5 instructions
they appear to have accepted enthusiastically. The jury considering
the state law tortious interference with contractual relations claim an-
cillary to federal antitrust claims awarded $51,000 in compensatory
and $6 million in punitive damages. 6 The defendant appealed, argu-
ing that the punitives violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments and excessive fines. The opinion
upheld the award, saying that the Eighth Amendment had no bearing
on a civil action not brought by the state, but hinted that there might
be circumstances under which an excessive punitives verdict would vi-
olate the Due Process Clause. 7
The defense bar wasn't long in accepting this invitation. In 1991
and 1993 the Court decided two cases under the Due Process Clause
in which it upheld large punitive verdicts while continuing to insist
that there might be some amount awarded under some circumstances
that would finally shock its conscience 8 (a phrase the Court did not
3 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
4 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
5 Id. at 260.
6 Id. at 262.
7 Id. at 276-77.
8 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 466 (1993) (up-
holding a verdict of $19,000 in compensatory and $10 million in punitives in a slan-
der-of-title oil and gas royalty dispute); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
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use, but which nicely evokes9 the uncertain steps the Court took in
this phase of its search for an approach to punitives). Its central diffi-
culty was that, having insisted that the Eighth Amendment did not
apply, but that due process did, the court was sailing in uncharted
waters. The problem flowed from the fact that it was the amount of
damages that was primarily objectionable, not the process by which
the jury arrived at that amount. That meant that if the Due Process
Clause applied, it was the part of the Court's due process jurispru-
dence not in fashion-the substantive due process cases in which the
Court had notoriously said in the early part of the twentieth century,
to paraphrase: "The state simply can't do this." 10
Unprepared to venture on those seas, the modern Court spent
the first half of the decade looking for a way in which to rein in what it
thought might be excessive awards. Toward the middle of the nine-
ties it found what appeared to be, in concept, a workable approach.
First, in a genuinely procedural ruling, it held that appellate review of
punitive damage awards was required.' 1 It has since refined this re-
quirement to require that the appellate review in question be de
novo. 12 More ambitiously, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,'3 it
held that in awarding and reviewing punitive damages the courts must
consider three substantive factors: the reprehensibility of defendant's
conduct, the disparity between the punitive damage award and the
actual or potential harm suffered by plaintiff, and the relation of the
punitive award to any civil penalties authorized for its conduct. 14
Moreover, in contrast to the earlier cases in which it agonized about
but did not reverse awards, the Court in Honda, Gore, and Cooper In-
23-24 (1991) (upholding a $1 million verdict, four times the claimed compensatory
damages, in a failure-to-insure claim).
9 The phrase comes from another line of due process cases, those regulating
police conduct. Refusing to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Frankfurter preferred to examine each case individually: "Apply-
ing these general considerations to the circumstances of the present case, we are com-
pelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience."
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
10 See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Substantive Due Process, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2569 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed.
2000) (tracing the development of the concept of substantive due process).
11 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1994).
12 See Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001).
13 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
14 Id. at 575-85.
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dustries demonstrated that it is willing to reverse cases in which either
the procedure was deficient or the amount of the award excessive.
By 1996 the Court had established a framework that, though not
elegant, was coherent, and encompassed both process and substance.
Due process required courts to deploy a serious appellate scrutiny of
punitive damage awards. Substantively, due process required trial and
appellate courts to look seriously at the relation of the punitives award
to several other relevant factors. An arguable defect in the scheme is
that, by making every punitives judgment a constitutional case, it
placed a significant burden on the courts that do such review, particu-
larly on the Supreme Court itself, since in the run-of-the-mill state
case, the U.S. Supreme Court will be the only possible federal forum
for such review. Having put itself in that situation, the Supreme Court
may have felt some pressure either to review a significant number of
state punitive damages cases or to establish more specific guidelines in
order more effectively to delegate that task. In Campbell it took the
latter course.
B. Rationing Punitives with Ratios
Like all but one of the punitive damage cases in which the Su-
preme Court has granted review, Campbell involved a commercial
wrong rather than a personal injury. 15 A bad faith claim against an
insurer, it scrutinized the behavior of an insurer whose behavior
looked bizarrely short-sighted. Having issued an auto liability policy
to the Campbells, who were then involved in a serious accident that
had cost a life, the insurer insisted on mounting a no-liability defense
where the facts looked quite bad for its insured-who had decided to
pass six vans in a row on a two-lane road. 16 The damage verdict was
almost certain to exceed policy limits if liability was found. Lawyers
representing those injured or killed in the accident offered to settle
for the policy limits of $50,000 (for multi-claimant accidents), and,
seeking to persuade State Farm to accept this offer, pointed out that a
refusal to do so might subject State Farm to bad faith liability. State
Farm's response was to ask its investigator to change his report, to
reassign the investigator, and to assign the case to outside counsel. 17
That situation put State Farm, the lawyer it had retained for the
Campbells, and the Campbells in a complex though common conflict
15 Honda is the exception, involving an alleged product defect that had caused
.severe and permanent injuries." Honda, 512 U.S. at 418.
16 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003).
17 Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141-42 (Utah
2001).
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of interest: the lawyer representing them was now risking their per-
sonal assets as well as the insurance coverage. That situation, some-
times by requirement of state law, sometimes because of counsel's
prudence, calls for the lawyer or carrier to alert the represented in-
sured to a possible conflict of interests and recommend that they con-
sider retaining additional counsel to advise them.' 8
Instead, the Campbells' lawyer reassured them that they risked no
liability and that "their assets were safe."19 He proved to be wrong: the
jury returned a verdict of $185,849 against the Campbells, an amount
$135,000 more than their policy limits. 20 State Farm refused to cover
the excess amount and helpfully advised the Campbells, "You may
want to put for sale signs on your property to get things moving."21
State Farm also declined to post a supersedeas bond in excess of its
policy limits. Apparently jolted into awareness of their predicament,
the Campbells retained new counsel who both prosecuted an appeal
and negotiated an arrangement that relieved the Campbells of per-
sonal liability and left State Farm believing that it, not the Campbells,
had been the victim of bad faith. 22 In this agreement the plaintiffs in
the original case agreed not to seek to satisfy the excess judgment
against the Campbells. In return, the Campbells agreed to pursue a
bad faith claim against State Farm, in which they would be repre-
sented by the lawyers prosecuting the original plaintiffs' claims. More-
over, the Campbells agreed to allow the original plaintiffs to have a say
in major litigation decisions in that suit and to remit to those plaintiffs
90% of any eventual proceeds of the claim. 23
The Campbells' last set of lawyers were more successful than their
first. They presented evidence not only of the carrier's alteration of
documents in this case, but of what they alleged was a pervasive prac-
tice of settlement practices and systems of pressuring State Farm em-
ployees to disregard what plaintiffs contended were the carrier's
fiduciary responsibilities to their insureds. 24 Although State Farm had
by then thought better of its refusal to pay the original award, the jury
18 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1993) (requiring insurer to notify in-
sured of conflict and to pay the fees of such an independent counsel if not waived).
19 Campbell 65 P.3d at 1142. Neither the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, nor
that of the U.S. Supreme Court indicates whether the lawyer was conveying his own
views (which might bind the carrier on a theory of apparent agency), or had been
instructed so to inform the Campbells. The Campbells do not appear to have sued
the lawyer for malpractice.
20 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 413.
21 Id.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 413-14.
24 See Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1143.
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awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages to the two Campbells
and $145 million in punitives. The trial court reduced the compensa-
tory damages to $1 million (a remittitur the Campbells accepted) and
the punitives to $25 million.25 The Utah Supreme Court reversed,
reinstating the $145 million award of punitives; it did so in the face of
Utah authority that presumptively limited punitive awards to three
times compensatory damages. 26 At this point the case that plaintiffs
had offered to settle for $50,000 had become, exclusive of legal fees, a
$146 million liability.
State Farm sought certiorai and the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the amount of punitives was vastly in excess of
constitutional limits. Along the way, the Court changed the landscape
of punitive damages in two ways. Reaffirming Gore, Campbell gives it
both more specific texture and supplies some evidentiary guidelines
to trial judges. First, it limits the evidence adduced to justify punitive
damages to the kinds of behavior (inflicted within the state imposing
punitives) that harmed the plaintiffs. In so doing, it had harsh words
for the Utah courts (and by implication the plaintiffs' lawyers) who
had produced, at some expense, "extensive expert testimony regard-
ing fraudulent practices by State Farm in its nation-wide operations."27
Second, the Court decided to give Gore more specificity by finding in
its prior cases the lesson that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process." 28 The opinion went on immediately to sug-
gest that the appropriate ratio might be even lower: "In Haslip, in up-
holding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of
more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be
close to the line of constitutional impropriety. 29 That proposition ap-
peared to have special force where there had already been a "substan-
tial" award of compensatory damages.
The opinion is in some ways surprising and, if seen only through
the eyes of doctrine, relatively unsupported. Though the Court as-
serted that its prior cases had taught the lesson about arithmetic ratios
between compensatory and punitive damages, many readers of those
cases might find it difficult to discover that lesson. Browning-Ferris had
upheld a punitives verdict 106 times the compensatory damages. 30
25 Id.
26 See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808-09 (Utah 1991).
27 Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1143.
28 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
29 Id.
30 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262
(1989).
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TXO had upheld punitives 526 times the compensatory damages.31
Haslip had affirmed punitives four times the compensatory damages
and 200 times the plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses.3 2 There is surely
something to be said for upper limits and rules of thumb. Maximum
sentences have long been part of criminal law. But the Court made
no effort to reconcile this rule of thumb with the basic justification for
punitive damages. Nine (or four) are nice round multipliers, but it is
difficult to say why they are the right ones.
Even more difficult is the relation between the "substantiality" of
compensatory damages and the ratio of punitives. Campbell suggests,
without squarely so holding, that punitives should, all things being
equal, be less when compensatory damages are nontrivial. Why? One
might argue the opposite: that the existence of substantial punitive
damages demonstrates the seriousness of the harm for which, other
things being equal, the defendant should be punished more, not less,
seriously if punitives are warranted. I do not think that this argument
is clearly stronger than that put forth by the Court, but I do not think
it is any weaker, either. Moreover, if ratios have constitutional moor-
ing, they might be easier to find in the Eighth Amendment cases than
in due process precedents. In some respects the Court in Campbell did
what legislatures do when they set maximum sentences for particular
crimes. Campbell establishes not an absolute maximum but a pre-
sumptive ratio between harm as measured by compensatory damages
and punitive sanctions. Something is missing.
One can see in Campbell a commentary on the economics of per-
sonal injury litigation, and perhaps also some impatience with state
courts that have not taken the Court's punitive damages cases suffi-
ciently to heart. That commentary is in many respects incomplete and
it may in part rest on myth and demonology rather than what we know
with some empirical certainty. But it is also connected to the real
world in ways that the opinion does not make clear. The next Part
describes what we know about that world, before turning back to the
implications of Campbell.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE REAL WORLD
Punitive damage awards do not come very often, and mostly they
are not very high, either in absolute amounts or in relation to the
compensatory damage awards. They play two roles, one involving out-
of-court, pre-litigation behavior, the other involving the decision to
bring litigation and the parties' ensuing litigation conduct. To use
31 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
32 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6 & n.2 (1991).
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the facts of Honda as an example: the prospect of punitive damages
may affect the manufacturer's decision about product design, warning
labels, and marketing-all pre-suit conduct. The availability of puni-
tives may also affect the behavior of Honda and the plaintiffs lawyer
in litigation. There is a rich and often thoughtful literature concern-
ing the role that punitives play in deterring and shaping conduct;33 I
do not intend to address that literature. I shall rather concentrate on
the way in which the availability of and limits on punitive damages
affect litigation conduct-the propensity to sue, defend, and settle,
and some aspects of litigation strategy.
Campbell itself combines these two aspects in a potentially confus-
ing way: because it is an insurance bad faith claim, the primary con-
duct complained of was itself the conduct of litigation-the original
litigation arising from the auto accident claims against Campbell. The
availability of punitive damages for bad faith claims have some effect
on insurance carriers' settlement behavior; those effects are not the
focus of this exploration. When the settlement of that suit turned into
a bad faith claim against the Campbells' insurer, the second aspect of
the case surfaced; it is on that aspect of the case I want to focus, after
standing back from the case's particulars to see how punitives func-
tion in the economy of civil litigation.
A. Punitive Damages and Litigation Behavior
The starting point is a model of litigation in which, in most cases
involving punitive damages, both the plaintiff and the defendant will
treat the case as part of a litigation portfolio, with the plaintiff seeking
to maximize gain and the defendant seeking to minimize loss. With-
out defending that model in any detail,3 4 one can sketch its outlines
quickly and intuitively. Most defendants sued for substantial punitive
33 For discussions of this "torts" aspect of punitive damages, see Developments in the
Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1783-1806 (2000) (summa-
rizing the literature and suggesting reforms); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 IHARV. L. REV. 869 passim (1998) (taking a
skeptical view of current punitive damage practice); and Symposium, The Future of
Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1 passim (providing a range of views, many sup-
portive). Compare Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583 passim
(2003) (arguing that both historically and normatively, punitive damages redress a
dignitary harm to an individual), with Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Socie-
tal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 349-56 (2003) (recasting the debate about the justifica-
tion for punitive damages after Campbell).
34 For a more elaborate exposition, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Liti-
gation, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 183 (2001).
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damages will be large institutions..3 5 Those institutions and their in-
surers36 will treat punitives as a regrettable cost of doing business, and
will seek to minimize their occurrence and impact through the man-
agement of litigation.37 On the plaintiffs' side the picture is more
complex. First, some punitive damage awards are sought and gained
by business entities;3 8 those entities will behave like their defendant
counterparts, seeking to maximize gain, managing this piece of litiga-
tion as part of an overall business strategy. Another group of plaintiffs
will look like the Campbells, individuals for whom the conduct of any
litigation, much less punitive damage litigation, is a once-in-a-lifetime
event. But in the overwhelming majority of the latter cases, such liti-
gation will be handled by lawyers operating on a contingent fee basis.
Those lawyers will typically be part of smallish firms, which select cases
and clients, advance litigation costs, and provide legal representation
in return for a share of the eventual recovery. Although the final deci-
sion to sue, settle, or try rests in clients' hands, those inexperienced
clients are likely to seek and follow the advice of their lawyers in mak-
ing such decisions. Many of the key aspects of litigation thus will de-
pend on the perceptions of the lawyers, who are handling not only the
individual case but a portfolio of claims, ranging from small and low-.
risk to large and high-risk. Successful defendants and successful plain-
tiffs' lawyers manage those litigation portfolios, with an eye not only to
the individual case but to the relationship of that case to others.
Punitive damages cases occupy symmetrically opposite positions
in the litigation portfolios of plaintiffs and defendants. Punitive dam-
ages are the venture capital investments of the plaintiffs' bar. They
are rapidly falling high-risk stock picks for defendants and their insur-
ers. In both situations they represent a relatively rare form of liability
with high up- and down-sides for the parties to the lawsuit. Because
the size of the potential gain or loss is unknown, such claims require
the litigants to make or cover big bets, with all the expectable reac-
tions seen in high-stakes investments.
35 Tom Baker has recently given us added anthropological evidence to support
this intuition. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAw & SoCy REV. 275, 275-78 (2001) (noting the conditions under
which "blood money"-payments that hurt defendants as opposed to insurers-is
sought).
36 Although punitive damages are not insurable, they will often be blended with
claims for compensatory damages-even more often after Campbell-that are insured,
so the defense will often be conducted in whole or part by an insurer.
37 Again, the defendants may also seek to minimize the long-term cost of puni-
tives by changes in the fundamental conduct of business, but that decision is not the
focus of this exploration.
38 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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The point is most obvious for the plaintiffs' bar. Most such work
is handled on a contingency basis, with the lawyer bearing the risk of
an unsuccessful claim in return for a share of the recovery in success-
ful claims. A well capitalized and diversified plaintiffs' lawyer will want
a range of cases in her litigation portfolio, with some relatively certain,
if low returns, and others requiring more risk but carrying higher po-
tential returns. In some law offices workers' compensation claims
might typify the first set of cases, and personal injury claims the sec-
ond.39 Such a litigation portfolio will enable the lawyer to pay the
electric bill while investing sufficient time and money in all cases to
yield, on average, good service to clients and a satisfactory income for
her.40 But portfolio managers typically invest a small portion of their
assets in much riskier ventures, which carry a much higher potential
for return: venture capital is the typical designation. For a plaintiffs'
lawyer "venture capital" cases are those with a small possibility of an
unusually high return on invested time and money. Punitive damages
cases will typically fall into such a category. 41 They often require large
investments-in investigation and discovery, in experts, and in trial
itself, since the largest awards of punitives usually come after a trial.
But trials are notoriously uncertain, and, as we shall see, many puni-
tive damages awards are quite low. So, for the plaintiffs lawyer such a
case is risky, and she should take it only if she can cover that risk with
other, lower-return, less-risky cases.
Consider the operation of these propositions in Campbell. The
lawyers who litigated the bad faith claims initially held much more
ordinary litigation portfolios. They had agreed to represent the two
parties alleging injury and death from Campbell's negligent driving.42
These claims were standard litigation investments-maybe a bit riskier
than some, because the $50,000 limit on all claims from a single acci-
dent meant that the recovery wouldn't be large. When the insurer
said it would contest liability, these claims became substantially riskier,
because the plaintiffs' lawyers now knew they might not recover any-
thing at all and would have to invest substantially more to take the
case to trial. In the final stage of the litigation-after their clients had
agreed not to execute on the Campbells' personal assets in return for
39 See Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordi-
nary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs'Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
219, 235 (2001) (distinguishing "speculative" from "routine" litigation).
40 Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the
Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2002).
41 So will some cases where punitives are not in prospect but there is substantial
doubt about liability and high compensatory damages if liability exists.
42 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 413 (2003).
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assignment of the Campbells' bad faith claims against their insurer-
their clients' claims took on a third coloration. Now those claims had
a significantly higher upside-the original tort plaintiffs stood to col-
lect their entire personal injury judgment and there was a prospect of
punitives in addition. But to collect either they would have to invest
even more-to show that State Farm's actions were other than an act
of inadvertence or poor judgment-and that would involve discovery
into State Farm's operations, expert testimony about insurers' prac-
tices, and the like. Moreover, because State Farm paid the excess
judgment after the punitive damages claim was filed, it now asserted
that there were no compensatory damages for bad faith, 43 so the en-
tire claim might evaporate. This had become the sort of case a firm
can't afford very many of. And all that was before the Supreme Court
rendered its judgment.44
For the insurer, bad faith claims for punitive damages represent a
different sort of litigation portfolio management problem-holding
an investment in a rapidly falling market. Both insurers and self-insur-
ers hold litigation portfolios too. But they are in the position of
hedge-fund operators, trying to minimize losses while other parts of
the portfolio-the business operations-produce gains. The task is to
know which securities not to buy at all (immediate settlement being
the analogue of a no-buy decision), which to invest in (by commenc-
ing a defense), and which to sell (by settling on the courthouse steps
or at trial) if the market unexpectedly falls. For State Farm, Campbell
initially represented a liability claim at the high end of the ordinary-
an insured allegedly causing serious injury and harm to two claimants,
but with exposure capped by the policy limits, here $50,000. Generi-
cally speaking, the carrier wants to pay out as little as possible on the
portfolio of such claims, some by settling early, some by successfully
defending liability. But much turns on evaluating the merits of the
43 See id. at 414.
44 We should not allow our focus on the principal antagonists in Campbell to ob-
scure what may have been the most imaginative and effective representation in the
case-that of the Campbells' second lawyer, whom they retained after the insurer had
told them to sell the house and to put up their own funds for the appeal bond. That
lawyer was representing in the first instance not a plaintiff but a defendant who had
suffered an adverse judgment for an amount larger than his insurance coverage. The
case's potential depended on being able to turn the excess judgment into a claim for
the insurer's bad faith, with the excess judgment itself becoming evidence of the
harm done to the client. The record does not reveal whether this second lawyer ap-
proached the plaintiffs' representatives with the claim-assignment/ release proposal,
or whether it came from the plaintiffs. In either case, this risk-shifting agreement
solved the Campbells' problems while allowing those who had the greatest capability
and incentive to pursue the bad faith litigation to do so.
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cases, and in making regular reassessments as the cases develop. And
for insurers, there is both an added twist and a moral temptation. In
the case of a security one has bought, a collapse of the market leaves
its holder with the loss of that amount. In the case of an insurer, the
loss can be for more than the value of the policy. That creates a temp-
tation for the insurer to gamble with the insured's interests as well as
its own: because the typical policy places the decision to settle in the
insurer's hands, the carrier is in a position to exact a forced loan from
the insured-a loan in an amount that will be unknown until the judg-
ment. To create incentives not to succumb to this temptation, most
states have created a cause of action for bad faith failure to settle. 45
Those claims typically carry punitive damages. To continue the invest-
ment metaphor, for the insurance carrier operating in a bad faith ju-
risdiction, the wrongfully unsettled case is like a nineteenth century
stock in which the holder could lose not only its original value but also
suffer a call to contribute additional capital.
Turning from the generic characteristics of bad faith/punitive
damage cases to Campbell itself, it looks like the nightmare of every
investment manager. A low level analyst-the claims investigator-
made what turned out to be an accurate assessment-the stock/claim
should be sold/settled immediately. 46 But those to whom he reported
overruled him, presumably hoping to maximize the carrier's profit-
ability by snatching victory from impending defeat. Even worse, these
managers tried to hedge against the possibility they were wrong by
ordering the investigator to alter his initial report, thereby shifting any
resulting losses to the insured-by removing from the record evi-
dence that some thought the claim should be settled.47 In the normal
course of events such efforts at concealment tend to come to light.
When this one did it enabled the plaintiffs (the Campbells) to con-
tend not just that they should not have to bear this loss but that the
insurer should be punished for trying to shift it to them.
Punitive damages change the stakes of civil litigation, not just by
making them higher, but by making them higher by an uncertain
amount. This was true in a big way before Campbell, and it will con-
tinue to be true after Campbell to a lesser extent. Risk affects litigation
behavior. Increasing risk and, for the plaintiff, linking it to the possi-
bility of a much higher than usual return on litigation should affect
45 For the most complete analysis of the situation, see Kent D. Syverud, The Duty
to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990).
46 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 413.
47 See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141-42 (Utah
2001).
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litigant behavior. It will cause both plaintiffs and defendants to want
to carry only a few cases with the possibility of punitive damages in
their litigation portfolios. For the plaintiffs, such cases represent the
small chance of a very high return; for the defendants, such cases
carry the small risk of a very great loss.
Campbell should change the risk calculation in some respects. It
will lower the ceiling of expectable return for plaintiffs and control
the size of the risk for defendants. But before assessing the magni-
tude of this change, we need to understand the respects in which
Campbell was an unusual case, as well as the respects in which it was a
usual one. These characteristics affect its expectable impact on future
litigation.
B. The Incidence of Punitives
We know quite a bit about punitive damages litigation. The best
study of punitive damages 48 was published in 1997, the year after Gore
was decided. Theodore Eisenberg and collaborators at the National
Center for State Courts and in the statistics department of Cornell
University drew on a sample of civil litigation in the nation's forty-five
most populous counties, 49 supplementing it with more specific studies
of Cook County, Illinois, and California. 50 Their findings deserve wide
recognition, 51 and they shed light on what Campbell does and does not
do. In particular, though the opinion does not cite this study, the
study provides both the best description and perhaps the bestjustifica-
tion for what the Court did in Campbell.
The principal finding is that jury awards of punitive damages are
rare. Such an award was made in about 3% of all jury trials and about
6% of the trials in which plaintiffs prevailed and recovered some dam-
48 Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623 (1997).
49 The forty-five county sample was drawn from a National Center for State
Courts project, collecting data on the seventy-five counties in which about a third of
the national population is concentrated.
50 The source, date, and size of the samples is described in Eisenberg et al., supra
note 48, at 630 n.22.
51 One form of recognition has been the contestation of some aspects of the find-
ings. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOWJURIES DECIDE 245-48,
251-52 (2002). Sunstein's principal statistical quarrel with Eisenberg is that the latter
relies on logarithmic rather than arithmetic comparisons of compensatory to punitive
awards, thus masking the extent of the variation, an argument to which Eisenberg and
Wells have responded. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive
Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 Sup. CT. ECON.
REv. 59 (1999).
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ages. 52 That is an important fact for policymakers: whatever one
thinks about punitive damages, they are not pervasive in jury deci-
sions. We do not have equivalent information on the incidence of
punitive damage claims, as opposed to punitive damage awards, and it
is predictable both that more such claims are filed than go to judg-
ment and that some cases are settled where punitive damage awards
seemed likely.
Closer to my argument is the finding concerning the size of puni-
tive damage awards: the median punitive damage award is both rela-
tively low in amount ($50,000) and about the same size as the median
award of compensatory damages. 53 So Campbell represents a rare
outcome in punitive damage litigation. But-and this is equally im-
portant-the mean and the median awards differ by a factor of ten.54
Expressed in simpler terms, only a small number of very high awards,
like the one rendered by the Campbelljury, both make headlines and
push the arithmetic mean much higher than the midpoint of all such
awards. It also means that a high proportion of all punitive damages
results from a small number of cases. So Campbell represents the sort
of case that makes a significant contribution to the total sum of puni-
tive damage awards. By implication, a new rule that affects that small
proportion will affect the total amount of punitive damages, will shift
the mean closer to the median, and, likely, will change the dynamics
of punitive damages litigation.
The authors found a consistent relationship between awards of
compensatory damages and amounts of punitive damages awarded.
That relationship was both positive-"punitive damages awards in-
crease monotonically with compensatory damages" 55 -and negative:
"[c]ases with low or zero compensatory awards and substantial puni-
tive awards comprise approximately 2 percent of the punitive
awards." 56 Finally, the study noted quite substantial regional varia-
tions in the award of punitive damages, a pattern that matched re-
gional variations in the award of all damages.57
Most important, and most relevant to Campbell, is the study's ef-
fort to create a statistical model that would account for the relation-
ship for the mean punitive damage award in relationship to punitive
damage awards. Using detailed data from two Rand Institute studies,
52 Eisenberg et al., supra note 48, at 634.
53 Id. at 633.
54 See id. at 639 tbl.2.
55 Id. at 639.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 640 (noting that the reported range was from 0% to 27% of all plaintiff-
winner jury trials).
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one of California and one of Cook County, the study did regression
analyses, with a conclusion that was both striking (one rarely finds ex-
clamation points in statistical analyses) and speaks directly to Campbell.
The authors found "a strong and statistically significant relationship between
compensatory and punitive damages" and that about 80% of all punitive
damage awards fell within a compensatory/punitives multiple of 8.11 7.58
The study went on to suggest that were courts or legislatures to enter
this field, they would do best to adopt, not a straight multiplier, but a
principle suggesting that awards more than two standard deviations
above or below this line be viewed with special scrutiny.59
One further finding bears on the Campbell litigation. Most of the
successful punitive damage claims were brought by individuals, with
the defendants almost evenly divided between other individuals
(39%) and businesses (37%).60 Butjust over 6% of the plaintiffs were
businesses. 61 And although the largest mean awards came in individ-
ual vs. business litigation, the second highest mean punitive damages
award and the highest compensatory/punitive multiplier came in bus-
iness vs. business litigation.62
Although two amicus briefs in Campbell cited the Eisenberg study,
the opinion neither cited nor discussed it. 63 But in many respects the
opinion is a gloss on the findings of the article, and the study may be
the best guide to the real significance of the opinion. The first point
of contact is the opinion's most notable contribution to punitive dam-
ages law-its focus on the significance of the compensatory/punitive
ratio. The Eisenberg study confirms the empirical significance of
such a focus. The study confirms another respect in which Campbell
was representative of punitive damage litigation: most of it involves
individual plaintiffs-although the proportion of individual defend-
ants is marginally greater than the proportion of business defend-
58 Id. at 651 (emphasis added); see id. at 651-52.
59 See id. at 652-55.
60 Id. at 634 tbl.1.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 639 tbl.2.
63 An amicus brief in support of State Farm cited the study for the proposition
that many awards were reduced by courts. Brief of Certain Leading Business Corpora-
tions as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13-14, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289). Another amicus brief, authored
in part by two of the Eisenberg study's authors, cited the study somewhat more ger-
manely for the low incidence of punitive damages and their general correlation with
compensatory awards. Brief of Amici Curiae of Certain Leading Social Scientists and
Legal Scholars in Support of Respondent at 4-5, 19, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289).
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ants. 64 Whatever else the Court was doing, it was not selecting a
random factor in the world of punitive damages: the relationship of
compensatory to punitive damages is descriptively significant as well
as-after the decision in Campbell-normatively important.
Second, the Court was descriptively right about another aspect of
Campbell-the unusually high ratio of compensatory and punitive
damages in Campbell. That circumstance alone makes Campbell unu-
sual among punitive damages cases. In a world in which the median
punitive award essentially matches the award of compensatory dam-
ages, an award 145 times greater is an outlier. On one hand this
means that the situation Campbell confronted was quite rare-a statisti-
cal outlier that arguably called for some sort of judicial response or
correction. On the other hand it means that Campbell should not af-
fect the outcome in the vast majority of punitive damage awards. So
the case, because unrepresentative in the ratio of punitive to its com-
pensatory damages, will have little effect on the "ordinary" punitive
damage case.
But-because the tail of the curve is long (and the difference be-
tween the ratios of mean and median compensatory/punitive awards
differs by about tenfold), Campbell will have a significant effect on the
right-hand tail of the curve, substantially curtailing high-end punitives.
Finally, the Eisenberg study furnishes the missing key, the Rosetta
Stone to the most striking part of Campbell: where did the Court get its
"single-digit" multiplier? The study suggests that the Supreme Court
reads not only the election returns but also statistical studies. It takes,
as its presumptive multiplier, what the study describes as the "best-fit"
formula describing what was actually happening in its two large data
sets-a multiplier of just over eight times the compensatory damage
level. The Court perhaps made, however, one important change in
what the studies' authors saw as the best approach to the problem of
statistical outliers in punitive damages. The study suggested that out-
lier awards be assessed not with reference to a straight multiplier but
by establishing a range-two standard deviations above and below the
"best-fit" multiplier line.65 The Court did not introduce this refine-
ment specifically, though one can see a lay approach to this point in
the opinion's repeated admonitions that "few awards exceeding a sin-
64 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 48, at 634 tbl.1.
65 Id. at 653-54.
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gle-digit ratio" are appropriate and that "there are no rigid
benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass. 66
If Predictability furnishes an important key to understanding the
most mysterious aspect of Campbell, it is equally important in helping
us predict how the new rules it announces will affect party behavior in
the prosecution and settlement of cases presenting the possibility of
punitive damages cases, a topic explored in the next Part.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
Campbell should matter not at all in the large majority of punitive
damages cases. Campbell may matter a lot in the small number of cases
with outlier punitive damage awards-outliers not in the sense that
they are high in absolute amount, but because they exceed the com-
pensatory damages by an abnormal multiple.
Both points are significant. If the most common punitive damage
award simply matches the compensatory damages, the new rule will
not affect the outcome-unless courts hold that jurors should be in-
structed in awardable ratios, in which case it could conceivably increase
the mean award of punitives.
But in a world in which means and medians differ by a factor of
ten, the effect on means may be more important than the effect on
medians. If awards are highly concentrated in a small number of
judgments, rules that change the outcome of those judgments will
matter. Campbell, if it proves stable,67 is likely to change those judg-
ments by holding down the ratio to nine times compensatory dam-
ages. By doing so, it is likely to have several effects-on filings, on
settlement behavior, and on litigation tactics. Each is sketched below.
First, Campbell may diminish by an unknowable proportion the
numbers of claims in which punitive damages are sought. Campbell
does so in two ways. Most obviously, it lowers the maximum return
from investing in a given claim carrying punitive damages. If one
treats compensatory damages as given (a point I will contest below), it
lowers the ceiling on the maximum amount of punitives. On the facts
of Campbell itself, if $1 million is the correct, sustainable figure for
compensatory damages, something like $9 million would be the maxi-
66 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (empha-
sis added). In this respect the Campbell court took an approach closer to that of Theo-
dore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 51, at 83 tbl.5.
67 On the stability of Campbell, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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mum for punitives.68 That matters because in nearly 80% of litigated
punitive damages cases the plaintiffs were individuals 6 9 whose lawyers
were almost certainly investing their own funds to finance the claims.
Campbell required gathering a good deal of evidence-indeed too
much evidence, as the Supreme Court decided-concerning State
Farm's claims settlement and other practices. It required expert testi-
mony, presumably on general insurance practices and on how State
Farm's differed from the norm. Because an axiom of litigation is that
every plaintiffs expert will be matched by a defense one, and because
both experts will produce reports on the basis of which they will then
be deposed, such investments quickly expand by more than arithmetic
proportions. Because plaintiffs' lawyers will be calculating risk/invest-
ment/return expectations in making case selections, one imagines
that at the margin they will pursue fewer punitive damage claims.
Reinforcing that supposition is another feature of Campbell, its
holding that the proof on which punitive damages are based must
concern similar behavior in the same jurisdiction.7 0 That holding in-
creases the cost of proof in a number of cases. By insisting that the
punitives be based on similar behavior in the same jurisdiction, Camp-
bell lowered economies of scale in some punitive damage cases. In
Campbell itself, the plaintiff could rely in part on testimony about na-
tional practices of the defendant, testimony from expert witnesses for
whom it was worthwhile to study the practice of large national insur-
ers. It may not be worthwhile for such experts to focus on, say, the
Utah operations of a particular insurer. If one follows the implica-
tions of this proposition, Campbell may exacerbate one of defendants'
complaints about punitives-their uneven geographical distribu-
tion.7 1 By requiring punitive plaintiffs to produce localized proof,
Campbell may further concentrate the incidence of punitive damages.
It will be worthwhile, one can predict, for experts and lawyers to focus
their investment in locales that either have high population concen-
tration or a history of high punitive awards, ignoring other states. The
consequence may be to concentrate even further the geographical
maldistribution of punitive damages awards.
68 The opinion makes this assertion more complicated by hinting that the ceiling
on punitives may be even lower where substantial compensatory damages were
awarded, as in this case. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419.
69 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 48, at 634 tbl.1.
70 See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421-24.
71 Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 20, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No.
01-1289).
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Beyond filing behavior, Campbell will likely affect decisions to set-
tle or try a case once it has been filed. If Campbell's compensatory/
punitives ratio proves robust, in large-stakes punitives cases defend-
ants are risking less by going to trial on a punitive damage claim. Put
simply, on the facts of Campbell they now face a maximum of $9 mil-
lion in exposure, not a sky-is-the-limit risk. This may be the single
most important effect of Campbell, but it is an effect that will be diffi-
cult to measure. Paradoxically, one indicator of this effect might well
be an increase in the number of reported punitive damages verdicts,
though with lower compensatory/punitive ratios than in the most dra-
matic pre- Campbell cases. If defendants are more willing to risk trial
(because they have lower prospective losses), Campbell might well re-
sult in more cases going to trial, and, since one assumes that plaintiffs
will bring stronger rather than weaker cases to trial, more punitive
damage judgments, at a lower compensatory/punitive ratio, could
result.
Third, because Campbell links the maximum punitive damages to
the compensatory damage award, it will place more pressure on proof
of ordinary damages, including noneconomic damages. Such dam-
ages-in Campbell it was emotional distress resulting from the
threatened loss of their home72-will serve two purposes. They will
provide additional recovery and they will provide a higher multiplier
for punitives. Both sides will invest proportionally more in proof of
compensatory damages, knowing that they are affecting not one but
two aspects of any resulting damage judgment. To illustrate again in
Campbell, the trial judge granted a remittitur for compensatory dam-
ages, reducing them from $2.6 million to $1 million. At the time this
move seemed far less significant than his lopping $120 million off the
punitives. After Campbell it looks more important: in a post- Campbell
world the presumptive maximum for punitive damages on a $1 mil-
lion award will be $9 million, but on a $2.6 million award it will be $23
million. Presumably defendants, conscious of this factor, will now ar-
gue that appellate courts reviewing punitive awards must also review
de novo the compensatory damages which supply the multiplier of
those awards, and one can predict that both sides will be aiming pleas
at the U.S. Supreme Court to do the same. This may not be a task the
Court relishes, but by linking punitives to compensatory damages, it
has set the scene for such requests.
All of the preceding speculation assumes that Campbell proves a
durable resting point. It may not. Since Campbell was decided, one
72 See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah
2001).
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respected federal appellate judge has distinguished it and affirmed a
punitive damage award thirty-seven times greater than the compensa-
tory damages in a case alleging bedbugs in a motel room.73 By con-
trast, an appellate court in California has reversed a punitive damage
judgment in a vehicular roll-over case, suggesting that Campbell, prop-
erly understood, did not only address disproportionate punitive dam-
ages awards but realigned the entire focus of punitive damages,
ordering remittitur unless the plaintiffs accepted punitives five times
greater than the $5 million compensatory damages.7 4 Like the
amount of the damage award in Campbell itself, these decisions may be
outliers. Or they may be signs that the roiling will continue; if it does,
of course, the effects on litigation behavior will be difficult to predict,
because the players will be calculating not only the odds in their cases
under existing law but also the odds that they can, in this case, achieve
a change in the law in their favor.
CONCLUSION
Campbell is an interesting case. It continues the Court's efforts to
adjust the outcomes of civil litigation by concentrating on a small
group of cases occupying one end of the damages distribution curve.
It does so by setting what amounts to a maximum sentence that will
vary with the amount of compensable harm caused by defendant's be-
havior. In so doing, the Court, without explicitly saying so, is mapping
the doctrine of punitive damages on the empirical data about the inci-
dence and relationships of such rewards. As a result, the risks and
rewards of punitive damages will become less speculative, somewhat
more ordinary. That will have little effect on most punitive damage
cases, in which the awards are rather modest. But it will shift patterns
of litigation investment in the riskiest of these cases.
73 See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.).
74 Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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